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WHAT DO WE KNOW
ABOUT ENTERPRISE ZONES?
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, most states have targeted certain depressed areas for revitalization by
providing a combination of labor and capital tax incentives to firms operating in an "enterprise
zone" (EZ). A partial equilibrium model is used to analyze the theoretical effects of various EZ
incentives on zone wages and employment. I review empirical evidence on the operational
success of EZ programs in Britain and the U.S., and present new evidence from the 1990 Census
on the success of the Indiana program.
Most British zone businesses are relocations, with an annual cost per job of approximately
$15,000.U.S. surveys find that much zone activity comes from expansions of existing
businesses, with the average cost per zone job ranging from $4,564to$13,000 annually (about
$31,113 per zone resident job).
How do zones perform relative to what would have been their performance in the absence
of zone designation? Evidence on this issue is summarized for the state of Indiana, where the
zone program appears to have increased inventory investment and reduced unemployment claims.
But new evidence based on the 1990 Census of Population indicates that the economic well-being
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and NBEREnterprise zone programs are geographically targeted tax,
expenditure and regulatory inducements hich have been part of
subnational economic development strategy since the early 1980s.
At last count, 37 states and the District of Columbia have
established some form of EZ initiative. While they differ in
specifics, all the programs provide tax preferences to capital
and/or labor and other development incentives in an attempt to
induce investment expansion or location, and to enhance
employment opportunities for residents in depressed areas.1
EZ5 have appeared in federal legislation on several
occasions over the last decade, but there is currently no federal
EZ program. The concept returned to national prominence most
recently following the civil disturbances in Los Angeles in April
and May, 1992. The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate of
the 103rd Congress adopted H.R. 11. It contained a pilot program
to establish 50 EZs over a five year period.2 The tax
incentives included a 50 percent reduction in capital gains taxes
for profits from interests held in a zone for at least 5 years
(the current maximum rate is 28 percent), a $20,000 immediate
expense deduction for newly purchased capital equipment, a 15
percent credit on wages paid to zone residents with a cap of
1Most EZs are designated in urban areas, but occasionally,
rural areas are selected. Federal legislation included rural areas
as well. See Erickson and Friedman (1990).
2See Lavation and Miller (1992), and the Joint Committee on
Taxation (1992) for a discussion of proposals in 1992.
1$3,000 per worker annually, and an annual deduction of up to
$25,000 for purchases of stock in businesses investing in EZS, up
to $250,000 for each person. President Bush vetoed the
legislation on 4 November 1992.
EZs have been criticized on the grounds that they will be
ineffective and inefficient in stimulating new economic activity.
This criticism is part of a longstanding debate on the effects of
intersite tax differentials on the location of capital
investment. If any tax-induced investment only represents
relocation from another state, then tax competition is a zero—sum
game for the country as a whole. In addition, the preferential
treatment of certain types of investment or employment within EZs
may induce decisions which would be uneconomic in the absence of
the tax incentives.
The concern with net capital investment may less relevant
for EZ5 since redistribution even within the state may be an end
in itself.3 If investment is relocated from local labor markets
with low unemployment to local labor markets with higher
unemployment, the incentives may generate efficiency gains for
the economy as under—utilized resources are tapped. Efficiency
gains may also result if reductions in unemployment produce
positive externalities such as reductions in social unrest.
It is also possible that, in addition to encouraging
3EZ investment may give individuals employment experience that
enhance their long run employability. Thus even a relatively short
runecbnomicdevelopment program may have long runeffects(See
Bartik, 1991)
2existing businesses to locate in particular geographic areas, the
incentives may induce the creation of new businesses that would
not otherwise have been started. Such new businesses could
produce taxable profits and incomes which would reduce the
revenue cost of the incentives.
The empirical evidence on the effect of differential state
taxes on the location of industrial activity is mixed. Surveys
of firm location have found that firms choose sites on the basis
of primary locational factors (proximity to markets, labor costs,
infrastructure, and utility costs) while tax cost differentials
are influential at the nargin when these other factors are
similar at alternative sites. EZ tax incentives may have a
greater influence across localities within a state, than across
states in a federal EZ program. Recent econometric analyses
have emphasized the importance of controlling for interstate
differences in public service provision when estimating the
effects of tax differentials. While low—tax jurisdictions
directly reduce business costs, high—tax jurisdictions may have
highly skilled workers and a high qualityofpublicservices,
bothof which indirectly reduce the costs of doing business.
Using firm—level data, Bartik (1985) and L. Papke (1991) find
statistically significant elasticities of industrial activity
with respect to state and local taxes.4 These estimates suggest
'Bartik finds an elasticity of —0.2 to —0.3 of new branch
plants with respect to state corporate tax rates. L. Papke
examines start-up firms in five manufacturing industries, and
estimates elasticities with respect to combined federal, state, and
local tax rates of —1.59 (Furniture), —5.62 (Communication
3that EZ incentives might well generate induce new capital
investment.
The experience and appraisal of EZ5 are the subject of this
paper. The next section outlines a conceptual framework for
analyzing the effects of an ES program inside and outside zone
boundaries. I present estimates of the percentage change in zone
wages under several incentive scenarios. In Section 2, I discuss
some methodological issues involved in measuring the success of
an EZ program. The British ES experiment is described in section
3, and section 4 surveys the state ES programs in the United
States. Section 5 focuses on the EZ program in Indiana. It is
one of the oldest state programs, and has been evaluated with a
variety of types of data. New evidence is presented on the well-
being of Indiana zone residents using 1980 and 1990 Census data.
I briefly discuss the difficult issue of program cost
effectiveness in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7 with
observatinns about a proposed federal program and some unresolved
issues.
I.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Thissection presents a theoretical framework for analyzing
the effects of EZ incentives on zone wages and employmemt.
First,the effects of ES incentives on wages and employment
Equipment), and -15.7 (Womens' Outerwear). Additional examples on
both sides of the issue include Canton (1979), L. Papke (1987),
and Bartik (1991). Carroll and Wasylenko (1990) review 17 recent
studies.
4inside the zone are analyzed in a partial equilibrium model.
Estimates of changes in wages and employment for different EZ
wage and capital subsidy packages are presented, and the major
findings are summarized. Second, while zone tax incentives are
confined to zone firms and the factors they employ, the effects
of the program may not be. The section concludes with a general
overview of the implication of an EZ program for aggregate
national employment and investment.
In brief, if zones are small relative to the rest of the
economy, economic theory predicts that the effect on zone wages
and employment will depend on the elasticity of supply of factors
to the zone, and on the elasticity of demand for zone output.
For plausible parameter values, a labor subsidy or an equal—cost
subsidy to both zone capital and zone resident labor will raise
zone wages. A capital subsidy alone may actually reduce zone
wages. Employment effects are likely to be small if labor is
inelastically supplied.
If zones are relatively large and spillovers into the rest
of the economy are considered, the effects are more difficult to
predict. The net employment effects for the nation of a federal
EZ program depend on parameters in both the zone and non—zone
sectors of the economy: the relative size of the two sectors,
the elasticity of substitution of factors in the two sectors, the
elasticity of substitution of the zone and non—zone products in
consumption, and the aggregate elasticities of supply of factors
of production. The greater the number of areas designated EZ5,
5the smaller the effects on zone wages. If capital is relatively
fixed in the aggregate, as many empirical studies suggest, the
net effect will be to relocate productive facilities inside the
zone.
An overview of the model
The typical EZ program offers tax incentives which reduce
the costs of businesses located in the zone. These benefits may
include subsidies to capital, or labor, or both, or a benefit
related to total costs (an equal proportional subsidy for capital
and labor) .Allthese subsidies would tend to increase zone
production ——existingzone fir-ms increase production, and new
firmsbegin production in the zone."New' zone firms may be
start—upcompanies,but they may also be existing firms that
relocate or expand into the zone. This output effect encourages
firms to employ more of both labor and capital in the zone.
If only one of the factors is subsidized, or if one is tax—
favored, a substitution effect accompanies the output effect.
Forexample, a subsidy to labor alone lowers costs and increases
output.This would increase the use of both capital and labor.
In addition, the firm substitutes the subsidized labor for
capital in its production process. In the case of a labor
subsidy, this substitution effect reinforces the output effect
andencourages increases inemployment.
In the case of a capital subsidy, capital becomes relatively
less expensive and firms substitute away from labor and toward
6capital. While the output effect of a capital subsidy encourages
firms to hire more of both labor and capital, the substitution
effect causes firms to substitute capital for labor. A subsidy
to capital promotes employment only through the output effect and
may actually reduce employment if the substitution effect
dominates.
The relative magnitudes of the output and substitution
effects depend on the elasticity of demand for the product and
the ease with which labor can be substituted for capital in the
production process. In addition, the effect of either subsidy on
wages and employment depends on the labor supply response. The
relatively small labor supply elasticity that is suggested by
most empirical evidence means that either subsidy would have a
larger impact on zone wages than on zone employment.
Effects inside the zone
A partial equilibrium model of zone production (detailed in
Appendix 2) is used to illustrate the effects of different EZ tax
incentives on zone wages and employment.5 Zone firms produce
output with the labor of people living inside the zone (zone
resident labor), with the labor of people who commute from
outside the zone (non—Zone resident labor), and capital. The
5'rhe "spatial mismatch" literature provides an alternative
approach to modeling EZ5.But this literature focuses on the
movement of people and firms to the suburbs as the cause of
employment problems for those who continue to live in the inner
cities; especially blacks (see Hoizer (1991)); it may be less
relevant to small EZ5 within a larger metropolitan area.
7model allows for two types of labor since many EZ programs
restrict labor subsidies to zone residents. The two types of
labor may have different supply elasticities. Capital is free to
flow into the zone in response to the incentives (i.e., in
infinitely elastic supply) 6
The numerical estimates depend on the output (or product
demand), substitution, and labor supply responses. If zone
products are close substitutes for products produced outside of
the zone, then the elasticity of demand for zone products will be
relatively large. This would be typical of manufacturing
products. However, surveys of zone firms suggest that much zone
production is for a local market (trade and services, for
example), and heterogeneous enough to have a rather small
elasticity of demand.7
In Indiana, for example, 74 percent of total receipts of
firms participating in the program is derived from sources inside
the zone. The 1990 Census data for Indiana indicate that while
36 percent of zone workers are employed in manufacturing, 60
percent are employed in a service industry. Consequently,
6Capital will flow into the zone until the rate of return, net
of the subsidy, returns to its original level.
7These smaller trade and service firms are often the specific
target of zone incentives. See, for example, the statement of Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of
the Treasury (1992). The emphasis on small firm job creation is
based on Birch's (1981) much—popularized finding that small
businesses were the source of most new job opportunities.
Subsequent researchindicates that the true proportion of jobs
generated by smaller firms is close to their actual share of the
workfdrce(Armington and Odle (1982),and Brown, Hamilton, and
Medoff(1990) .smaller demand elasticities may be typical of most zone
businesses; calculations are presented for a range of
elasticities.
For a cost-minimizing firm, the factor substitution
elasticity is the percentage change in the ratio of capital to
labor divided by the percentage change in the ratio of rate of
return on capital to the wage rate. A high substitution
elasticity indicates that it is relatively easy to substitute one
input for the other. The common Cobb-Douglas assumption of
unitary factor substitution elasticity is used in these
calculations, as suggested by long run estimates.8
A high labor supply elasticity means that the number of
people willing to work rises substantially with a small increase
in the wage rate. Empirical evidence suggests that overall labor
supply response is small.9 However, the labor of disadvantaged
or unskilled workers may be more elastically supplied so again, a
range of labor supply elasticities is included.10
Some EZ programs distinguish between types of employees.
Zone labor subsidies might apply, for example, to any worker
employed in the zone, or the subsidy may apply only to the wages
of zone residents. Both types of labor subsidies are included in
8See Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) for a
discussion of the range of estimates.
9See Hainermesh (1993) and Killingsworth (1983).
t0Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) estimate a labor supply
elasticity of 0.4 for men in the lowest decile of the wage
distribution.
9the model in AppendiX 2.
I illustrate three types of zone incentive packages below:
a subsidy to zone wages, a subsidy to zone capital, and an equal-
cost subsidy to zone labor and zone capital. The major findings
are summarized below.
• A subsidy to all labor employed in the zone always increases
zone wages (and employment). The effect on the wage is larger,
the larger is the elasticity of demand (in absolute value) and
the smaller is the elasticity of labor supply. If labor supply
is completely inelastic, a one percent increase in the wage
subsidy raises the wage by one percent regardless of the product
demand elasticity. A labor subsidy targeted to zone residents
increases zone wages by more than a general labor subsidy.
• A capital subsidy reduces zone wages at low elasticities of
product demand and low labor supply elasticities. Even for
products with relatively elastic demand, the increase in the zone
wage is much smaller from a 10 percent capital subsidy than with
a 10 percent labor subsidy.
• Most EZ programs involve a subsidy to both capital and
labor. An equal—cost subsidy to all labor and capital employed
in the zone will also reduce zone wages if the demand for the
10zone product is completely inelastic.11 At higher product
demand elasticities, an equal-cost subsidy to both factors
increases zone wages by from .33 to 1.54 percent. When zone
residents are targeted, that is, only their wages are subsidized,
an equal-cost subsidy has a substantially larger effect.12 The
estimated increase in zone wages ranges from 2.5 to 5.2 percent.
• The changes in the price of capital and labor outside the
zone will be small. However, the total effect on non—zone
capital or labor returns will not be.13 For example, Bradford
(1978) illustrates that a subsidy to capital in a small
jurisdiction raises the gross (and net) return to capital outside
of the zone only marginally. But this small increase accrues to
all capital in the rest of the economy. Thus, the total effect
of the EZ policy on the return to capital is the product of the
change in the return to capital (which is small) times the total
amount of affected capital (which is large). The total effect on
capital income will be of the same order of magnitude as the su
11Wage income is assumed to be three times the size of capital
income, so the rate of wage subsidy is one-third that of the
capital subsidy.An equal cost subsidy is, for example, a one
percent subsidy on capital and a .33 percent subsidy to labor. See
Appendix 2 for details.
12An equal cost subsidy when capital's share is .25 and zone—
resident labor share is .05 is a one percent capital subsidy and a
five percent labor subsidy.
13Partial equilibrium analysis assumes that zones are small
relative to the rest of the economy. Capital is completely
elastically supplied to the zone with no or little change in the
price of capital. Appendix Table 2 illustrates that the change in
non-zone wages is small.
11of EZ subsidies provided.
General equilibrium effects
The partial equilibrium discussion above does not allow for
feedback effects from non—zone production and non—zone factors of
production. If zones are small relative to the rest of the
economy, as in state programs and proposed federal legisl&tion,
then the feedback effects will be negligible. Gravelle (1992)
illustrates that as zones become larger, however, general
equilibrium effects should be considered.14
The net employment effects will depend on the relative size
of the zone and non—zone sectors, the elasticity of substitution
of factors in the two sectors, the elasticity of substitution of
the zone and non—zone products in consumption, and the aggregate
elasticities of supply of factors of production.'5 Gravelle
(1992) illustrates the importance of the size of the zones in a
general equilibrium analysis of a capital subsidy. The major
conclusions follow.
'4While in the partial equilibrium case, capital is elastically
supplied to the zone, in this static general equilibrium framework,
capital is fixed in the aggregate. Gravelle cites several
empirical studies which fail to find a statistically significant
savings response to changes in the after—tax returm to capital.
See Ballard (forthcoming) for a review of the evidence.
15Gravelle (1992) simplifies the analysis by assuinimg certain
parameter values for these elasticities. In McLure's (1970)
general equilibrium analysis of the locational effects of tax
policy, he substitutes parameters of interjurisdictional mobility
for the traditional Harberger assumptions that both factors are
completely mobile.
12• As the number of zones (or fraction of initial output eligible
for zone incentives) becomes larger, the impact of the subsidy on
zone wages and employment becomes smaller. In the limit, if the
entire country is designated a zone, a capital subsidy has no
effect on zone wages. When the capital subsidy does increase
wages, each additional zone reduces the benefits to existing
zones in direct proportion.
• Non-zone wages and employment will be affected by a zone
subsidy to capital. Whatever the percentage increase in zone
wages and employment, wages and employment outside of the zone
will fall by an equal percentage. Aggregate employment in the
country will be unaffected.
• The same general outcome would occur with a general
equilibrium model of a labor subsidy. The more areas that are
designated zones, the smaller the effects on zone wages and
employment. With very mobile labor, the result would be to
relocate production locations, with little effect on relative
incomes. The primary effect would be inefficiency in the
location of investment.
II. HOW IS ZONE SUCCESS MEASURED?
Zone evaluation depends primarily on two factors -—program
goals and the nature of the available data. Often, the
legislation is unclear about whether the goal of the zone program
13is to increase net employment or investment. Some have argued
that these areas are in such economic distress that maintaining
the existing levels of employment and investment are desirable EZ
goals. The studies reviewed here typically assume that the
intent of the legislation is to create new jobs in the zone, not
merely relocate jobs from outside of the zone. These jobs may be
full-time, part—time, or of limited duration, since the
legislation typically does not specify the type or duration of
job itisintended to create.
In practice, zone success is frequently measured by the
amount of investment undertaken after the designation, the
increase in the number of firms in the zone, and the change in
zone employment. Cost-effectiveness is measured by direct
spending and foregone revenue per job created (or, if the goal of
the program is zone resident employment, cost per zone resident
job) . Determiningwhich jobs were relocated from outside of
the zone presents a practical difficulty. This problem could be
addressed with more detailed data (tracking employer
identification numbers, for example). The key methodological
issue is how to separate the effects of zone designation from
jobs and investment that arise from other factors ——forexample,
general upturns in the economy or in the area surrounding the
zone. Alternatively, which of the measured changes in jobs and
investment are attributable solely to the zone program?
-
Surveyor case study methodologies provide useful
information on zone participation, but they cannot definitively
14answer this question. Firm managers' estimates of net job
creation or investment are subjective, and even candid managers
may have difficulty attributing a certain number of new jobs to
zone incentives alone. Surveys of zone administrators are even
more problematic, since the responses may be self—serving.
Positive survey results alone are not enough to declare a program
a success, because the difference between a success (net job
creator) and a failure (relocated jobs) may reflect differences
in the relative candor of the respondents.
Econometric analysis is better suited to performing the "but
for the zone" experiment. If the zone sites were randomly
selected, the effect of the program could be measured by
comparing the performance of the experimental and control groups.
Actual EZ designation, of course, is based on economic
performance, so the data are nonexperimental. This sample
selection problem can be addressed with a variety of
techniques.16
But econometric analyses of zone success face a practical
difficulty. Conventional economic data are not available by zone
since most zone boundaries are drawn solely forthe purposes of
the program. In most states, zones do not coincide with census
tracts or taxing jurisdictions. As a result, zone areas cannot
be pinpointed in standard data collections. While econometric
analysis can address the sample selection problem it must contend
16See L. Papke (1991) for a discussion of alternative
estimation techniques.
15with a geographic mismatch problem.
In the next few sections, I present survey and econometric
evidence on zone success in Britain and in the states. The
British national program was intended to generate new industrial
activity in areas with little or no industry and few residents.
State EZ programs, by contrast, typically designate zones in
areas with relatively high unemployment rates where the residents
meet some predetermined poverty threshold. Thus, state EZ5 have
an explicit community revitalization focus.
III. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
In 1981, two years into the Thatcher government, the U.K.
designated 11 areas as EZ5, expanding to 25 in total in 1983.17
The zones were small relative to U.S. zones, ranging in size from
100 to 900 acres, and consisting of vacant, unoccupied or
deteriorating industrial land within an economically declining
community. In contrast to the state zones in the U.S., British
zone boundaries excluded both existing business and residential
areas. The U.K. program focused almost exclusively on industrial
development —communitydevelopment was not a specific goal of
the program.
The U.K. program included a four part, ten year incentive
package:
17Peter Hall reportedly introduced the original notion of
geographic areas free of normal government regulatory policies and
importduties ("freeports") in a 1977 address to the Royal Town
Planning Institute (Hall, 1977).
16• an exemption from local property taxes on industrial and
commercial property,
• a 100 percent allowance (deduction) from corporation and
income taxes for capital expenditures on industrial and
commercial buildings,
• an exemption of sales of undeveloped lands from the
Development Land Tax,
• reductions in administrative requirements such as planning
permission and government statistical reporting for a ten
year period.
The British program also included public ownership of
facilities. Significant public sector involvement was a
characteristic of a number of zones even before designation, such
as direct land ownership or nationalized corporate ownership of
property or buildings. For example, in the zone in Swansea, 450
acres of derelict land were reclaimed and new infrastructure
provided before designation.18 In Swansea alone, public
ownership of vacant land rose from 47 percent in 1981 to 89
percent in 1986, and public investment over this period,
excluding the EZ incentives of rates relief and capital
allowance, totalled 16 million pounds.
The British experience has been evaluated in number of
studies which include government-funded monitoring reports (Roger
18See Bromley and Morgan (1985) and Bromley and Rees (1988) for
details of the Swansea enterprise zone.
17Tym and Partners, 1984) and private evaluations of specific
zones.19 Most are detailed firm level surveys and personal
interviews with entrepreneurs both inside and outside the zone.
While different researchers employed different measures of zone
success, there is remarkable agreement across studies that the
British zone program has failed in its goal of generating new
industrial activity.
The Tym report covers the initial 11 zones. There was a
substantial increase in industrial activity in the zone —by
1987, over 4,300 firms were operating in the zones. However, the
Tym report indicates that the primary effect of the zone was
intrametropolitan relocation —86percent of firms relocating in
the zone were from the same county, and their managers reported
that they considered moving to the zone prior to the EZ program.
The survey found no differences between employment
generation, investment activities, or production of companies in
zones versus outside the zones. The (surprisingly candid)
managers of zone firms responded via the survey that only about
25 percent o new jobs in the zone were attributed to zone
-
designation.
Other studies of individual U.K. zones report similar
findings.20 Summarizing, it appears that between 50 and 70
t9See B. Rubin and Richards (forthcoming) for a detailed
comparison of British and several U.S. state EZ programs.
20See Shutt (1984), Barnes and Preston (1985), Thomas and
Bromley (1987), Talbot (1988), Schwarz and Volgy (1988).
18percent ofzone firms represented relocations. Zone firm
managersreported that the property tax incentive (exemption) was
the only significant incentive provided by the zone program, and
frequently ranked this factor third in importance after site
characteristics and market access.
While the British EZ program had no explicit labor subsidy,
there were effects on zone employment. About 13,000 out of
63,300 zone jobs were thought to represent net new employment.21
None of the studies includes a figure for disadvantaged workers.
Schwarz and Volgy (1988) estimate that the cost per new job
between 1981 and 1986 for the original 11 zones was approximately
£45,000, or $67,000. A follow-up government—sponsored study to
the Tymreportconsiders job creation in the local economy
surrounding all 24 of the U.K. zones and estimates the cost at
£23,000 per new job.22 This estimate includes jobs created in
the local economy as well as inside the zone. Using this figure,
Rubin and Richards (1992) calculate the cost of a new zone job to
be £50,000 or $75,000, or between $13,400 and $15,000 on an
annual basis. The government study continues to find that over
70 percent of jobs created in the zone were relocations from
outside of the zone.
The shift of firms into zones did have an effect on land
prices. Erickson and Sylns(1985)identify a boundary effect on
the local property market from zone designation. They find that
21Great Britain Department of the Environment (1986).
22PA Cambridge Economics (1987).
19a moderate increase in the price of zone industrial land
accompanied the alight increase in business development activity
in the two zones they examine. Thus, capitalization of zone
incentives into zone land prices came at the expense of property
bordering the zone where land values declined.
Citing the uniformity of evidence indicating that
relocations were the source of activity in the zones, the British
government decided to phase out the SE program. The tax
incentives for the initial zones expired in 1991, and the last
two zones designated will expire in 1999.
IV. STATE ENTERPRISE ZONES
While there is no operational federal EE program, 37 states
have enacted El programs as part of their economic development
policies. They differ widely in purpose, coverage, and incentive
provisions. For example, Michigan has only one zone, while
Louisiana has over 800. Most programs offer a combination of
capital investment and employment incentives with generally more
resources allocated to investment than employment incentives.
Investment incentives include the exemption of business—related
purchases from state sales and use taxes, investment tax credits,
or corporate income or unemployment tax rebates. Labor subsidies
include employer tax credits for all new hires, or zone resident
new hires, employee income tax credits, or job training tax
credits. Some states also assist firms financially with
investment funds or industrial development bonds.
20unlike the U.K., the criteria for eligibility in the states
depend upon zone population characteristics. These include
comparative unemployment rates, populatIon levels and trends,
poverty status, median incomes, and percentage of welfare
recipients.
Typical U.S. zone characteristics are reported in a
comprehensive survey by Erickson and Friedman (1990, 1991a,
1991b). Most zones experience negative population growth, prior
to designation and have unemployment rates well above the state
and national averages. Unemployment in the adjacent communities
at the time of zone designation is also generally above these
averages. Median family income in the zones surveyed in 1979 was
less than 60 percent of the comparable national figure, and the
average proportion of families in poverty was over three times
the national mean and 70 percent higher than that in the general
community. Minority residents comprise 45 percent of the typical
EZ population, about double the proportion in the larger
community and nearly three times the national average.
Zones are relatively small in area and population size. The
sample mean resident population is approximately 14,500 but the
median is 4,500 persons. The median zone size is 1.8 square
miles, and 75 percent of the zones contain less than 5.6 square
miles, although the mean is 25.6. Zones generally have different
land—use patterns than their surrounding communities. The
average share of industrial land (18.1 percent) is over twice as
large as in the host community, and the share of commercial land
21(15.3 percent) is about 70 percent higher than in their host
comnunities.
A survey of businesses located inEZs by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development found that only 9.1 percent had
relocated from outside the zone.23 An additional 7.5 percent of
the business surveyed were branches of non—zone firms, 26.4
percent were new businesses, 2.2 percent were businesses which
reportedly had been kept from closing, and 54.8 percent of zone
investments represented expansion of existing zone businesses.
The study was not able to determine, with the exception of the
firms which would have closed, whether zone investments would
have occurred in the absence of zone subsidies.
State EZ programs have been evaluated and compared in a
number of studies. As in the U.K., most studies analyze survey
responses of managers of zone firms. Program specifics and
findings vary widely ——Appendix1 lists evaluations of
individual state programs and multiple—state comparisons. The
scope and quality of these evaluations varies.
Rather than examining the diverse survey data from a large
number of programs, the remainder of this paper focuses on a
program for which there is both detailed longitudinal survey
evidence and econometric analysis of conventional data. -Like
many state programs, the Indiana EZ program includes both
subsidies to capital and labor. It has been in operation since
1984 —-longenough to generate several years of post—EZ data.
23See Erickson, Friedman, and Mccluskey (1989).
22Several of the survey studies mentioned earlier have concluded
that Indiana's program is one of the most successful.24
V. THE INDIANA ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAM
Initially, areas in six Indiana central cities were
designated as EZs in 1984; subsequently, others were added to
bring the current total to 15. Each zone has a ten—year
duration, subject to renewal. Firms participating in the program
have been required to report credits claimed, employment and wage
figures, origin of receipts and the like, to the Indiana
Enterprise Zone Board beginning in 1986.
To qualify for consideration and possible designation, the
area must have an unemployment rate at least 1.5 times the
average statewide unemployment rate, and a resident household
poverty rate at least 25 percent above the U.S. poverty level.
Its resident population must be between 2,000 and 8,000 persons
and its geographic area between 0.75 and three square miles, all
with a continuous boundary. While there is no explicit statement
of its goals in the original legislation, presumably the
intention of Indiana's program is to increase employment,
investment, and the economic well-being of zone residents. The
employment tax credits provided are similar to those in other
states, but the capital incentives are unusual, as explained
below. The tax incentives included in the Indiana EZ program are
24See Wilder and B. Rubin (1988), and Sheldon and Elling
(1989).
23the following:
• A tax credit against local property tax liability equal to 100
percent of the property tax imposed on all inventories located in
the zone.
• A total exemption from the corporate gross income (receipts)
tax of all incremental income (receipts) derived from sources
within the zone after the designation base year; however, if the
sale giving rise to the incremental income is outside of the
zone, it ineligible for the exemption.25
4 A tax credit of 5 percent of interest income received from
loans to zone businesses and residents for residential or
business real property improvement. (Existing loans qualify for
the credit, as well as new loans, and lenders claiming the credit
need not be located in the zone.)
• An tax credit for employers hiring zone residents equal to 10
percent of wages with a ceiling of $1,500 per qualified employee.
25lndiana's gross income or receipts tax is a tax on instate
receipts.Corporations pay the greater of this tax and the
corporate net income tax (where profits are allocated to tne state
based on the conventional three—factor formula).Typically, a
small firm will pay the gross income tax since no deductions are
taken in computing tax liability. Eligibility for the exemption
requires that the enterprise be legally organized as a corporation;
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations
do not qualify because they are not liable for the gross income
tax.
24• Zone residents are allowed an income tax deduction equal to
one—half of their qualified adjusted gross income with a ceiling
of $7,500.26
Indiana's employment tax credits are typical of other EZ
programs. The labor incentives are targeted at zone residents.
The property tax credit will be valuable to both profitable and
unprofitable (i.e., non-taxpaying) firms alike. However, since
the dollar amounts of both the tax credit for finns and the
deduction for employees are capped and not indexed for inflation,
these incentives have lost about 20 percent of their value since
adoption.27
Like other zone programs, the value of the tax preferences
is tilted heavily toward capital investment. Indiana's most
valuable investment incentive from a tax savings standpoint, the
inventory tax credit, is an unusual mechanism for increasing
investment. First, most states do not include inventories in the
base of the business tangible personal property tax.28 Eight
states do not tax any tangible personal property, and another 25
26A sixth incentive provides an income tax credit of up to 30
percent to individual investors for the purchase of stock in
start—up or expanding zone businesses. There are no data
indicating that this incentive has ever been used.
27This deterioration in value may explain, in part, the low
participation rate in the employment subsidy. Although 2,779 zone
residents were employed by 949 registered zone businesses in 1988,
• only 77 f inns (less than three percent) claimed wage credits for
employing qualified zone residents. See J. Papke (1990).
28unlike machinery and equipment, inventories are not
depreciable.
25states specifically exempt inventories. Like Indiana,
neighboring Ohio and Kentucky also tax inventories.
Second, zone programs in other states typically provide
incentives for investment in machinery or equipment rather than
inventories. U.S. inventories are sharply procyclical and it is
not clear what a large stock of site—specific inventories
represents. Further, the stock of inventories held (whether
inputs, good in process, or finished goods) will vary with the
production process of the firm. The value of the credit will
also vary by type of firTn.29 J. Papke and I (1992) calculate,
for example, that the inventory tax credit raises net profit
rates (after-tax rates of return) by from one to seven percent,
depending on the local property tax rate and industry type.
Third, the inventory tax credit applies to the total stock
of inventories in each tax year, not just to incremental
values.30 The 1988 total direct budgetary cost (revenue
foregone) of the Indiana EZ tax preferences amounted to $13.6
million, of which 84 percent was attributable to the inventory
property tax credit.
At a minimum, the inventory tax credit enhances the cash
For example, instrument manufacturers and retailers hold
about 25 percent of total capital in inventories, compared to only
five percent for manufacturers of petroleum products and providers
of business services.These fractions are calculated from the
Internal Revenue Service's Source Book of Statistics of Income,
1988.
30In 1991, the Indiana House Ways and Means Committee voted to
eliminate the inventory tax credit. See Eugene Carison, "Impact of
Zones for Enterprise is Ambiguous," Wall Street Journal, April 1,
1991.
26flow for f±rms which hold inventories. It will also increase
profits (decrease losses) of zone firms, and may compensate them
for the noncapitalized profit-reducing tharacteristics of their
EZ location (e.g., crime). Since the price of holding
inventories falls, zone firms will find it profitable to hold a
higher level of inventories than if it were a non-zone firm.
This may increase economic activity in the zone, and stimulate
investment in machinery and equipment which would not have
occurred in the absence of the program (particularly if
production for inventories takes place in the Zone).
The characteristics of Indiana's zone firms and their
employees have been detailed in five consecutive years of
registration data. These characteristics are briefly described
below.
An Overview of Zone Participants
The number and characteristics of participating firms have
not changed much over the life of the program.3' The number of
participating firms averaged about 1,000 each year. Retailers
constitute the largest single group, accounting for about one—
third of all participants. Business and professional service
enterprises ranked second (about 30 percent), followed by
manufacturers (about 19 percent) and wholesale distributors (13
percent). Eighty percent of firms are organized as corporations
31j• Papke (1990) summarizes the first three years of data.
The registration data from 1989 and 1990 are presented in
preliminary form by Rowings, Powers, and Sigalow (1992).
27(36 percent of those as S-corporations). About two—thirds of the
participants have fewer than 20 employees.
Firms reported 2,897 new jobs created in 1988, with 14.7
percent of those jobs going to zone residents. The preliminary
1990 data indicate that zone residents comprised 4.1 percent of
total zone employment, and 19 percent of all new zone jobs. On
average, the zone residents were paid about half as much as the
other employees (between $7,000 and $8,000). The average tax
saving per participating firm was $13,933 in 1988. The average
tax preference increases with the size of the business. For
example, the tax savings for the smallest firm (fewer than 11
employees) averaged $4,106, while the largest firms (over 100
employees) claimed $98,493 on average. Manufacturing firms
accounted for over 50 percent of the total tax saving.
The Employment and Investment Effects of Zone Designation
This section summarizes an econometric analysis of the
investment and employment effects of the Indiana EZ program.
Sample selection issues are discussed. This section also
illustrates the types of equations which can be estimated to
isolate the effects due to an EZ program alone.
L. Papke (1991) analyzes the effects of the Indiana EZ
program on investment and unemployment. I include several
specifications designed to separate the effects of zone
designation from other influences. I examine two types of
capital investment -—inventories,which are targeted by the
28investment incentives, and investment in machinery and equipment,
which would likely coincide with increased economic development.
The investment data are derived from the tax records of the
taxing districts surrounding the zone.32
Labor market effects of zone designation are estimated with
data on annual unemployment claims. Since one unemployment
office typically serves an entire city, the geographical mismatch
problem discussed in section 3 is more severe for the
unemployment claims data. But the data will reflect any
spillover effects from the zone into the community's labor
market.
As discussed in Section II, the question of EZ effectiveness
could be easily addressed if the programs were administered as
traditional experiments. But, the data are nonexperimental since
actual EZ designation is based on economic performance.
Nevertheless, by controlling for sample selection, the data can
be used to address the counterfactua]. question: How did zones
perform relative to what their performance would have been in the
absence of zone designation?
Thecorrect estimation technique for an experiment is
determined by the assumptions about the nature of the data.. If
zones are selected randomly, the effects of the program are
consistentlyestimated by a cross-section comparison of means
32A taxing district is a geographic area within whicft property
istaxed by the sametaxing unit and is taxed at the same total
rate.It is generally smaller in area than a township and, is
approximately the same size as an EZ.
29between the control arid experimental groups. No time—series
variation is necessary. Alternatively, if data are available
only for the experimental group, but are available both before
and after the experiment, then means can be compared across time.
In this case, consistent estimation does not require random
selection, but it does assume that all changes across time are
attributable solely to the experiment ——thereare no external
influences.
With panel data on zones before and after designation, as
well as non—zone jurisdictions, aggregate time effects can
control for external influences over time. Since EZ5 are
selected on the basis of depressed economic conditions,
specifications which allow for different types of sample
selection should be estimated. In particular, the specifications
should allow for EZ designation to be correlated with
unobservables affecting economic performance.
The three specifications include jurisdiction fixed effects.
Fixed effects take account of permanent differences across zones
which are likely to influence designation. For example, zones
may vary with respect to industrial Composition and
characteristics of the labor, force. In a second specification,
in addition to the fixed effects, selection is allowed to depend
on jurisdiction—specific growth rates. This allowa for zones to
grow at different rates and allows program designation to depend
30on these growth rates.33The third specification allows
designation to be based on lagged values of the dependent
variable as well as the zone—specific time invariant
unobservables (fixed effects). For example, this allows zone
designation to depend on the level of employment or investment in
the previous period.
The most basic model is given by equation (1).
log = +/3t+6EZ+u1 (1)
EZTt equals 1 if jurisdiction i is a zone in year t, and 0
otherwise.The variable y is either the annual level of
inventories, machinery and equipment, or unemployment claims.
The coefficient on the EZ dummy, when multiplied by 100, measures
the percentage change in inventories, for example, due to zone
designation. This specification includes an linear time trend
$t, and the a1s control for unobservables that are time—invariant
over the sample period and may be correlated with zone
designation.
The second specification, the random growth rates model
given by
log y1 =a1+ 1t+2t + + u1, (2)
33For example, M. Rubin (1992) claims that the New Jersey
program targets fast growing areas in preference to slow—growing
ones. Slow-growing areas might be targeted in other states.
31allows zone selection to be based not only on the level of
activity o, but on the growth rates aswell. This
generalization is desirable if, for exathple, fast—growing or
slow—growing areas are more likely to be selected. This second
model is more general than the first in that aggregate time
effects, 2t' replace the linear time trend.
specifications (1) and (2) control for varying degrees of
sample selection, but they impose the restriction that zone
designation has the same effect in each year after designation.
That is, EZ designation causes a permanent shift in the level of
activity in the zone, relative to its non—zone state. This may
be too restrictive if the influences of the incentives change
over time. This restriction is relaxed in
logy = +fit+6,EZYRl1+62EZYR2I + ...+65EZYR5I + u1. (3)
Thisis an extension of equation (1) which allows the effect of
zonedesignation to vary over its life. The EZ dummy is replaced
by a series of dummy variables for each year of zone designation;
for example, EZYR2I takes on the value 1 if jurisdiction i has
been a zone for two years in year t, and 0 otherwise.
The third specification, equation (4) below, accounts for
the possibility that designation is based on the lagged value of
the dependent variable before designation:
log y1 =o+fi2+plog y11 + 8EZI + uft. (4)
32The estimated effects are similar across specifications.
They indicate that the Indiana EZ program has permanently
increased the value of inventories by about 8 percent in the
zones relative to what it would have been without the program.
-
However,the value of machinery and equipment is reduced by about
13 percent. The latter could be a transitory one—time
adjustment, but the imprecision of the estimates make it
difficult to determine. Evaluated at the means of the sample,
this is equivalent to about a $5 million drop in the value of
depreciable personal property, and a $3.2 million increase in the
value of the inventories.35
Zone designation appears also to have a positive impact on
the local labor market. Unemployment claims decline by about 19
percent following designation, although this finding is more in
question because of the geographic mismatch. At the mean of
unemployment claims, this is about 1,500 fewer claims per year.
The evidence for a permanent effect on unemployment claims is
stronger than that for capital.
To summarize, it appears that the Indiana zone program has
had a positive effect on employment and inventories. A decline
in unemployment claims in the surrounding community, however,
does not necessarily imply an increase in the employment or the
tm4See L. Papke (1991) for a discussion of estimation techniques
for these specifications.
35Anecdotal evidence presented at a hearing of the Indiana
Legislative Tax Incentive Study Committee in June, 1992 indicated
that some of thenewzone firms are liquor stores and gun shops
warehouses which hold comparatively large inventories.
33economic well—being of zone residents. Whathashappened to the
income of zone residents? New evidence on their economicstatus
based on the 1990 Census iS presented below.
The Economic Well—being of Zone Residents
The 1980 and 1990 census years bracket the operation of the
Indiana EZ program which, as indicated earlier, began in 1984.
This section compares the economic status of zone residents
before the zone program began to a point six years after zone
designation. These differences are compared to changes over the
same period of time for non—zone residents in Indiana.
The decennial Census of Population and Housing contains data
on population, labor force, and housing characteristics at
different geographic levels. These levels include, in decreasing
order of size, state, county, minor civil division or township,
place, census tract, block group, and block.
Some housing characteristics and 100 percent population
counts are available by census block. Other economic data
(such as income and labor force characteristics) are available by
block group. A geographic block group consists of a cluster of
blocks within a census tract (or block numbering area for areas
without census tracts) which generally contain between 250 and
550 housing units. The Bureau of the Census SummaryTapeFile 3
Census blocks are small areas bounded on all sides by visible
features such as streets, roads, steams and railroad tracts, and by
invisible boundaries such as city, town township and county limits,
property limits and imaginary extensions of roads.
34contains block group level data: 100 percent counts of
population, and economic sample data weighted to represent the
total population in the block group.
After identifying the census tracts and blocks in each
Indiana zone, I identified the block groups which contain these
census blocks. In some cases the block groups may contain blocks
which are not designated EZs but economic data are not available
at a finer level of disaggregation.37
Table 1 contains a summary of zone resident characteristics
from the 1990 census and the change in these characteristics
since the 1980 census. The change between the two census years
reflects either five or six years of zone tax benefits. Zone
characteristics are constructed by aggregating all the block
groups within each zone in t980 and 1990.I then average these
data to obtain the zone characteristics provided in Table 1.
Zones lost population over this period. Zones lost about
2,300 people and 674 households on average. Per capital income
also fell about 2 percent, to an average of $5,235 (1980
dollars). Most zone residents are white, but the white
population fell by about two percentage points to 60 percent on
average. Black population increased by one percentage point to
36 percent. Zone unemployment fell by 1.3 percent overall to
about 8 percent, with most of the drop occurring in the male
37population is available by block (Summary tape file LA) and
could be aggregated to obtain exact zone population. Population
figures reported here are from block group aggregates, so it will
exceed the statutory maximum population for zones.
35unemployment rate. In addition, the fraction of people who
reported 'working in their place of residence" increased by
almost four percent (where "place" refers to the Census
geographic definition).
Table 2 presents the industrial composition of zone resident
employment in 1980 and 1990 and the changes between the two
censuses. About 30 percent of residents work in manufacturing,
down 6 percentage points from 1980. The proportion working in
retail (19 percent), finance and entertainment services (13
percent), and professional, health and education related services
(19 percent) each rose about two percentage points over this
period.
To determine whether the changes in economic status
described in Table 1 were unusual, it is useful to compare the
experience of the zones with urban non—zones of comparable size
within the state. As a comparison group, I randomly selected
block groups within 24 other urban Indiana places to compare with
the block groups which contain the zones designated in 1984 and
1985.Table 3 presents the difference between zones and non—
zones in the changes before and after the zone program. That is,
the change in non-zone characteristics between 1980 and 1990 is
subtracted from the change in zone characteristics across that
same period. Tables 4 and 5 contain the economic characteristics
for zone and non—zone block groups from which the Table 3
calculations were made.
The difference of differences reported in Table 3 indicate
36that the population loss was greater for zones, but population
also fell in non—zones. On average, block groups in zones lost
45 more people (26 more households) than did non—zones. Per
capita income in zones in 1980 ($5,313) was substantially less
than in non—zones ($6,722), and zone per capita income fell over
the 10—year period while non—zone per capita income rose to
$7,290. Unemployment fell more in zones than non—zones, but the
difference is small (.11 percent). Fewer zone residents work in
their place of residence relative to non-zones in 1990 (70
percent versus 74 percent), but the ratio did increase
fractionally more in the zone (.42 percent).
These zone effects estimated with the census data are much
weaker than those estimated econometrically. One interpretation
of this finding is that the econometric analysis allowed zone
selection to depend on place—specific growth rates. Similar
sample selection corrections cannot be made with only two years
of census data. For example, if slower-growing sites are
selected, and the selection is controlled for, then the zone
program has a large measured effect. This selection correction
cannot be made with the census numbers, thus accounting for the
smaller measured zone effects.
In summary, while the direction of the zone effects from the
census data are similar to those from the econometric analysis,
the results are much less strong. In spite of the reduction in
unemployment rates in the zones, the income numbers suggest that
zone residents are not appreciably better off with the Indiana EZ
37program.












percent white 59.50 —2.44







percent out of the
labor force 38.70 —2.94
percent men out of









Source: Author's calculations from the Census of Population and
Housing, 1980, 1990: Summary Tape File 3 (Indiana).
Note: Zone characteristics are constructed by aggregating over
block group data. Per capita income is from the prior year and
reported in 1980 dollars. Racial composition characteristics are
a fraction of total population. Labor force characteristics are
fractions of workers 16 years and older.
39Table 2. Industrial composition of employment



















& communication 6.32 6.54 0.22
percent in wholesale 3.71 3.52 —0.19
percent in retail 17.00 18.98 1.98













administration 3.45 3.20 —0.25
Note: See Table 1.
40Table 3. Difference of differences:
Differences between zone block changes between 1980
and 1990 and non—zone block changes between 1980
and 1990
in Indiana
Zone change from 1980 to
1990 minus non—zone
change from 1980 to 1990
total population —44.58
workers 16 years and over —27.75
households —25.63




percent unemployed men —0.11
percent unemployed women —0.17
percent out of the labor
force
-1.15
percent men out of labor
force
—2.10
percent women out of
labor force 0.66
percent who work in place
of residence 0.42
Source: See Table 1.
Note: Per capita income is from the prior year and reported in
1980 dollars. Racial composition characteristics are a fraction
of total population. Labor force characteristics are fractions
of workers 16 years and older.









and over 447.81 —85.68
households 237.21 —38.61
per capita income $5,196.82 —$116.41
percent white 49.43 0.01
percent black 41.01 4.89






percent out of the
labor force 40.68 —2.73
percent men out of





percent who work in
place of residence 69.83 6.36
Source: See Table 1.
Note: These data are for block groups which had become part of a
zone by 1990. Per capita income is from the prior year and
reported in 1980 dollars. Racial composition characteristics are
a fraction of total population. Labor force characteristics are
fractions of workers 16 years and older.





total population 844.13 —80.34
workers 16 years and
over 650.17 —57.93
households 331.59 —12.98
per capita income $7,289.69 $56.53
percent white 63.58 0.17
percent black 24.30 3.60










percent men out of
labor force 29.13 2.66
percent women out of
labor force 44.54 —5.50
percent who work in
place of residence 73.78 5.94
Source: See Table 1.
Note: These data are for non—zone block groups. Per capita
income is from the prior year and reported in 1980 dollars.
Racial composition characteristics are a fraction of total
population. Labor force characteristics are fractions of workers
16 years and older.
43VI. MEASURING THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
This section briefly discusses the limited evidence on EZ
cost effectiveness. Estimated costs per job from EZ programs are
compared to other federal employment programs. Cost
effectiveness is measured by direct spending and foregone revenue
per job created or cost per zone resident job. These measures
provide an accounting of the initial level of public investment
required per zone job created. But they are not a full cost-
benef it accounting of the program, since they do not account for
second—round feedback effects (such as zone employee removal from
welfare and income tax payments). The difficulty in determining
which jobs may be relocations has already been discussed.38
Generating jobs in distressed areas entails a variety of
costs depending on the type of program. The JOBS program of the
late 1960s and early 1970s subsidized the hiring of
disadvantaged, unemployed workers. The gross placement cost was
$3,200 (in 1969 dollars, or $10,752 in 1990 dollars) per hire.39
Bendick (1981) states that costs per job ranged from $11,570
($17,058 in $1990) in the Urban Development Action Grant Program,
through $13,000 ($19,110) per job in the Business Loan program of
the Economic Development Administration, to $60,000 ($88,200) per
job in the local Public Works program of the Economic Development
3&There is no accounting for the length of job tenure or type
of job.For example, Indiana's EZ program may encourage annual
hiring and firing since the employment tax credit is based on
annual average hires.
39Hamermesh (1978) explains that, while the subsidy was fairly
high, few employers took advantage of it.
44Administration.
Cost per job estimates from zone programs are not that
different from these earlier U.S. experiences with job subsidies.
Using survey responses for number of new zone jobs, M. Rubin
(1992) puts New Jersey's cost per job at between $8,000 and
$13,000 annually. J. Papke (1990) calculates that the annual
cost of an Indiana zone job was $4,564, and $31,113 per zone
resident job. It amounted to over $100,000 per zone resident job
in some zones.
Calculations of state EZ costs are complicated by the fact
that, in some state programs, local governments bear the brunt of
the cost. In New Jersey, the state funds the EZ program.4° But
in Indiana the most generous tax incentive is the inventory tax
creditagainst the local property tax. The credit reduces the
assessed value of taxable property in the zone and shifts the
remaining tax burden onto other local property sources. The cost
per zone job varies across zones.41 From 1986 to 1988, for
'°The most valuable incentives New Jersey offers include:
business tax credits for employee hires of public assistance
recipients, an exemption from state sales and use taxes on
purchases of tangible personal property, and materials and services
for construction activities, and a 50 percent rebate on
unemployment insurance taxes paid by employers on low—paid
employees.
41For example, the 1987 assessed value of the exempt
inventories in the Elkhart EZ was-$4.2 million, or 2.7 percent of
the total taxable property values in Concord township. To make up
this loss in tax base, $331,000 of taxes were shifted to the
remaining non-exempt properties. Without the exemption, the gross
tax rate in the district would have been $9.7807 (in dollars per
$100 of assessed value); with the exemption, the actual tax rate
was $9.8870, an increase of 1.1 percent. See J.A. Papke (1990) for
additional estimates of the tax cost shifted to loc4l residents in
45example, the average cost of the inventory tax credit alone per
new job ranged from $526 to $10,238, and from $1,154 to $67,571
for new zone resident jobs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some have argued that the uneven pattern of economic growth
across states and cities is evidence of a market failure and that
government subsidies may be appropriate to encourage a more
geographically even growth path. EZS can become valuable tools
for evaluating the effectiveness of tax incentives as economic
development policy, and can add to the longstanding debate on the
effects of tax competition on the location of capital investment.
Based on the U.S. state and British experiences, it is
possible to speculate about the likely effects of some of the
proposed federal EZ initiatives.42 First, the capital
incentives are likely to increase zone investment. It is not
possible to predict whether this will be net new investment or
relocation of existing businesses -—ourlimited U.S. survey
evidence on this issue indicates that start-up firms average
about 25 percent of "new" zone businesses. Capital incentives
may revitalize economic activity in depressed areas, but it may
well be at the expense of neighboring areas. Data from zone
programs suggest that the surrounding community is struggling
each zone.
'2Greene (1990) and Steuerle (1992) make recommendations
specific to a federal EZ program.
46economically as well.
State zone programs do not seem to have improved the
economic status of zone residents. Proposed federal wage credits
may stand a better chance of increasing zone resident income,
since the cap is higher than that in most states and it might
also be indexed. Certainly, the chances for improvement are
greater when zones are smaller relative to the rest of the
economy. It is unlikely that the proposed credit for stock
purchases will be influential, since few zone firms issue stock
specifically for zone location.
Several unresolved issues remain. If investment in certain
geographic areas is inhibited because the perceived riskiness of
an area increases the required cost of capital, EZ tax incentives
may at least partially offset the high cost of funds. But high
costs of capital may not be the problem if investment is
discouraged because of infrastructure deficiencies or an
unskilled work force.
If the goal of an EZ program is to improve the economic
status of zone residents, issues relating to their employability
are relevant. There may be few income gains if zone businesses
require labor skills not possessed by residents of the area. If
the business is attracted to the area to use its low—skilled,
low—wage labor, there may be employment growth without income
growth. Current residents may even be displaced by economic
development.
Direct assistance to business may be the most controversial
47type of state and local economic development policy. Tax
concessions or tax expenditures transfer the discretionary
authority for a public program to a non-public third party --
thefirm, in the case of EZ5. The employment and investment
effects of these tax expenditure policies are still being
evaluated.
48Appendix 1.
Studies of U.S. Enterprise Zones
State ?uthor
Multiple states L. Revzan (1983)
R. Funkhouser and E. Lorenz (1987)
M. Bendick, Jr. and D.W. Rasmussen (1986)
M. Srintnall and R. Green (1988)
M.G. Wilder and B.M. Rubin (1988)
R.A. Erickson and S.W. Friedman (1990, 199la,
199lb)
R.A. Erickson, S.W. Friedman, R.E. Mccluskey
(1989)
S.A. Lavation and E.I. Miller (1992)
B.M. Rubin and M.G. Wilder (1989)
A.W. Sheldon and R.C. Elling (1989)
California E. Litster (1990)
Connecticut Connecticut Department of Economic
Development (1985)
Illinois E.R. Jones (1985, 1987)
Indiana J.A. Papke (1988, 1989, 1990)
J.A. Papke and L.E. Papke (1992)
L.E. Papke (1991)
Louisiana A.C. Nelson and R.W. Whelan (1988)
Maryland U.S. General Accounting Office (1988)
New Jersey M. Rubin and R.B. Armstrong (1989)
Ohio S. Staley (1988)
49Appendix2: Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Zone Incentives
This appendix employs a partial equilibrium model to analyze
the effects on zone wages of a labor subsidy, a capital subsidy,
and an equal-cost subsidy to capital and labor. Labor subsidies
which target zone residents are also analyzed.
Production in the zone uses three inputs —capitalK, zone
resident labor L, and labor from outside of the zone L. The
package of zone tax incentives may include a subsidy to zone
capital r,zoneresident labor r, and/or non—zone labor
expressed as percentages (in decimal) of factor cost.
The production process in the zone is described by
Q =F(K,L2,L). (1)
The demand function for the zone product is described by
Q f(P). (2)
The two labor supply equations are
=g2(w) (3)
=g(w). (4)
Capital is assumed to be in infinitely elastic supply to the
zone, or
r =r0. (5)
Under the assumptions of perfect competition and profit





—= — dr+drK — ) (8)
50—= (—dr+ drK—) (9)
P =a(*





where ,P, , r, t2, and are the percentage changes
in output, price of output, capital, non—zone resident labor and
zone resident labor, and their wages, respectively, and the
after—tax rate of return on capital. In addition, a is zone
labor's share of total income, a is the non—zone labor's share
of total income, e and e are the elasticities of labor supply
for the two types of labor,and are the elasticities of
substitution between capital and the two types of labor.
This system results in the following two equations which
describe the percentage change in wages for the two types of
labor in response to any of the subsidies:
%A — — c2b12 (14)
b11b22
—b2b21
— - cLb2L (15) —
b12b21
whereb1-, =epaz+ (l—aN) e + aKaZ, b12 =epaw,b21 =epaz,
b22 =epaN+ (l—a)e + aKaN, c1=(ea2+ aKOZ)drZ + ePaNdr + (ePaK —
aKOZ)drK,
and c2 =eadr2+ (ePaM + aa)dr + (ePaK —aKaN)drK.
51Land ISaninput to production as well, but excluding land
from the model does not significantly alter the calculated wage
effects. A stylized fact of income distribution theory is that
most of national income is attributable to labor and the rest is
largely a return to capital. Since land is such small share of
total income, it's inclusion would not appreciably affect the
estimated wage effects.'3
Calculations are presented for a range of labor supply and
demand elasticities in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The estimates
are in the form of a percentage change in wages for each
percentage point change in the subsidy. For example, an estimate
of .4 means that a one percentage point increase in the wage or
capital subsidy increases the wage by .4 percent. The percentage
change in the wage can be converted into a percentage change in
employment by multiplying this estimate by the elasticity of
labor supply.
Case 1: HomogeneOUS labor
Consider first a type of EZ program which makes no
distinction between employment of zone residents and non—zone
residents. A labor subsidy is provided for all zone employment.
(This is a special case of the model above.) Both zone and non—
'3AS in Britain, EZ subsidies may increase the price of zone
land if its supply is fairly inelastic. While the total amount of
land in the zone is fixed in supply, the supply of industrial land
may not be. Exactly how much the price of land will rise will
depend on its elasticity of supply and the substitution
elasticities between land and the other inputs.
52zone residents share a common elasticity of labor supply." The
estimates of the percentage change in wages for a one percentage
point increase in the labor subsidy are'presented in panel 1 of
Appendix Table 1.
A subsidy to zone labor always increases the wage (and
employment). The effect on the wage is larger the larger is the
elasticity of demand (in absolute value) and the smaller is the
elasticity of labor supply. If labor is completely inelastic, a
one percent increase in the wage subsidy raises the wage by one
percent. The increase in the wage is 0.68 percent at a more
elastic labor supply elasticity of 0.3, and product demand
elasticity of 0.5.
The resulting percentage change in employment is found by
multiplying the percentage change in the wage by the labor supply
elasticity. For example, a 6.8 percent increase in the wage
causes an increase in employment of 2.04 percent if the labor
supply elasticity is 0.3.
Panel 2 presents the wage effects of a capital subsidy. A
capital subsidy reduces the wage at low elasticities of product
demand and labor supply. -Thereis a small positive increase in
the wage for products with a relatively elastic demand, ranging
from 0.09 percent with inelastic labor supply to 0.07 percent
with a 0.5 labor supply elasticity.
Most EZ programs -involve a subsidy to both capital and
44Following Gravelle (1992), a labor share in total output of
.75 is assumed.
53labor. The effect of an equal—cost subsidy to labor and capital
is presented in panel 3. wage income is assumed to be three times
the size of capital income, so the rate of wage subsidy is one—
third that of the capital subsidy. This combined subsidy will
reduce zone wages if the demand for the zone product is
completely inelastic. If the product elasticity is fairly high
(1.5) and labor is still relatively inelastic (0.3), an equal—
cost subsidy to capital and labor (one percent increase in the
capital subsidy combined with a 1/3 percent wage subsidy)
increases wages by 1.27 percent.
Case 2: Heterogeneous labor
Often an EZ labor subsidy is provided for the wages of zone
residents only (Indiana's program and H.R. 11 are examples). In
the model above, zone resident labor and non—zone resident labor
are treated as separate inputs in the production process. Non—
zone resident labor is assumed to be highly mobile across zone
boundaries (an elasticity of non—zone labor supply of 1.0 is
assumed).
Zone resident labor's share in total income is assumed to be
0.05, and non—zone resident labor's share is assumed to be 0.70.
This accords with survey data from the Indiana program which
indicates that zone residents are about seven percent of total
zone employment (provided zone residents are paid the same wage
as non—zone residents). If zone residents are paid half as much
as nonzone residents (as Indiana survey data also indicate) then
54these income shares correspond to zone employees comprising 14
percent of total zone employment. Capital's income share remains
0.25.
The effects on the wages of zone residents and non—zone
residents of a labor subsidy, capital subsidy, and equal—cost
labor and capital subsidy are illustrated in Appendix Table 2.
When only zone resident wages are subsidized (panel 1), variation
in the elasticity of demand has little effect on the change in
the wage. If zone resident labor is inelastically supplied, a
one percent subsidy to their wages alone increases their wages by
one percent (and there is no effect on non—zone resident wages).
Zone resident wages increase by about 0.75 percent if their
elasticity of labor supply is 0.3, and by about 0.65 percent if
their labor supply is 0.5. The increase in non—zone resident
wages is less than 0.01 percent in all cases. Thus, at lower
elasticities of demand, a subsidy to zone-resident wages only is
more effective at increasing the wages (and employment) of zone
residents than is a subsidy to all labor employed in the zone.
As in the homogeneous labor case, a capital subsidy causes
firms to substitute away from both types of labor, and wages to
zone residents and non-zone residents alike fall (panel 2). If
the product demand is very elastic (1.5) a capital subsidy
increases zone resident wages by 0.18 percent (with an elasticity
of labor supply of 0.3).
An equal—cost subsidy to zone resident labor and capital has
a substantially larger effect on the zone resident wage (panel
553). An equal-costsubsidycorresponds to a one percent capital
subsidy and a five percent labor subsidy. At a zone resident
labor supply of 0.3, an equal—cost subsidy increases zone—
resident wages by about 3 percent, regardless of the product
demand elasticity. If only zone resident wages are subsidized,
the EZ incentive can fund a much larger percentage increase in
the labor subsidy with a correspondingly larger effect on the
zone resident wage.45
45These results assume highly mobile non—zone resident labor
(a labor supply elasticity of 1.0). Calculations not reported here
illustrate that the equal cost subsidy estimates are not
appreciably altered by assuming a completely inelastic supply of
non—zone resident labor, or by assuming that zone—resident and non—
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0. 0667Appendix Table 2.
Subsidizing zone resident labor only.
Percentage change in zone resident wages and non—zone
resident wages
for various demand and labor supply elasticities
under three types of EZ tax incentives
-
Panel 1: One percent wage subsidy: zone residents only
a zone resident wage % a non—zone resident
wage
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0.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.5
0.0 1.0 0.73530.6250 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.5 1.0 0.74960.6423 0.0 0.00390.0057
1.0 1.0 0.75780.6524 0.0 0.00640.0091
1.5 1.0 0.76320.6591 0.0 0.00780.0113


















1.0 5.0 3.78903.2622 0.0 0.03190.0457
1.5 5.22993.99123.4470 0.04780.08910.1073
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